MARX’S CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

Most substantial contribution of Marx would be a clarification of his understanding of ideology. There is not a clear-cut definition of ideology. Marx’s treatment of ideology is unfortunately ambiguous, tense and scattered which makes the job of interpretation a tough one. The significance of the term ‘ideology’ is apparent with its complex connections to the whole system of Marx’s thought. Reconstruction of theory of ideology includes the evaluation of texts directly relevant to ideology as well as the ones that barely mention ideology. Discussion of a ‘break’ or ‘evolution’ or ‘continuity’ in Marx’s thought of ideology reflects a political choice about ‘who is Marx’. That is, it should be kept in mind that, evaluation of Marx’s ideas is not satisfactorily neutral and presentation of ‘who is Marx’ necessarily implies a theoretical position, including this very effort. The argument supported here will be one of ‘middle way’. Despite the undeniable change and improvement in Marx’s thought, it points an ‘evolution’ rather than a sharp ‘break’.

Keywords: Marx, Ideology, Hegel, Feuerbach, Consciousness and False Consciousness.

ÖZET

Marx açısından yapılabilecek en önemli katkı, onun ideoloji anlayışının bir açıklaması olacaktır. İdeolojinin kesin bir tanımi yoktur. Marx’ın ideolojiyi ele alması maalesef belirsiz, gerilimli ve dağınıktır ve bu da yorumlama işini zorlaştırır. İdeoloji teriminin önemi, Marx’in düşünce sistemini tümüyle olan karmaşık bağlantılıları ile ilişkilidir. İdeoloji teorisinin yeniden inşası, ideolojiyle doğrudan ilgili metinlerin yerleştirilmesini içerdiği gibi, ideolojiden çok az bahsedilen metinleri de içerir. Marx’in ideolojisi düşüncesinde “kopuş” veya “evrim” veya “sürekliklik” tartışması, “Marx’in kim olduğu” ile ilgili politik bir seçimi yansıtır. Yani, Marx’nın fikirlerinin yerleştirilmesinin tamamı edici derecede nötr olamayacağı ve “Marx’in kim olduğu” ile ilgili her çaba mutlaka teorik bir pozisyonu kabul etmek anlamına gelecektir. Bu yazida desteklenen argüman bir orta yol bulma çabası olup; Marx’in düşüncesindeki inkar edilemez değişşim ve gelişiminin kabulüne rağmen, keskin bir “kopuş” yerine “evrim” fikrini işaret etme evedeektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Marx, İdeoloji, Hegel, Feuerbach, Bilinç ve Yanlış Bilinç.

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INTRODUCTION

If we had the chance to bring Karl Marx to the academy today, it would be a remarkable gift. Within the present framework of academy, which specific branch could we associate him? It would be a hard time locating him to the departments such as philosophy, history, political science, political economy, and sociology which are unable to encompass his concerns. Surely, there would emerge some discomfort about interruption of the ‘scientific’ academy by ‘ideological’ Marx. Sharper arguments, such as claims about Marx as a prophet and Marxism as a religion “which promises paradise on this side of the grave” would have received appropriate answers from Marx (Schumpeter,1974:5). Nevertheless, perhaps the most substantial contribution of Marx would be a clarification of his understanding of ideology.

Evaluation of ideology in Marx’s writings poses some fundamental challenges for the researcher. Unfortunately there is not a clear-cut definition of ideology. Moreover, it is argued that there are several distinct and even sometimes contradictory treatments of ideology in Marx’s writings (Barret;1991:3). Thus, the evaluation of ideology requires a selection of texts, rearrangement of them and a construction of theory of ideology which necessarily results in a variety of interpretations according to the ‘ideological’ position of the interpreter. Still more, another problem is that Marx’s some critical texts about the analysis of ideology hardly use the term ideology (Larrain,1984:8). Overall, making sense of Marx’s usage(s) of ideology is an effort that requires not only the interpretation of the texts which are directly referring to ideology, but also the ones which does not mention ideology but have significant relation to ideology.

The significance of the term ‘ideology’ is apparent with its complex connections to the whole system of Marx’s thought. Here, the judgments about the evolution and/or break within Marx’s thought are closely relevant. Althusser’s claim about an ‘epistemological break’ is the foremost. He connotes that 1845, The German Ideology divides Marx’s thought into two periods; the ‘ideological’ period before and ‘scientific’ period after. The classification is offered as Early Works 1840-44, the Works of the Break 1845 (including Theses on Feuerbach and The German Ideology), the Transitional Works 1845-57 and the Mature Works 1857-83 (Althusser,1990: 34-35). Identification of a ‘break’ is not only a question of interpretation, but also of a political choice about ‘who is Marx’. For Althusser; in contrast to ethical humanist Marx, scientist and economist Marx is the Marx and should be the reference point.3 There are sharp criticisms about Althusser’s arguments such as McGregor’s.4 Some interpretations such as Larrain suppose that, rather than a ‘break’, there is an evolution in Marx’s thought (Larrain,1980:36).

3 Althusser’s notes on 1844 Manuscripts demonstrates this point well: “the Marx furthest from Marx is this Marx, the Marx on the brink, on the eve, on the treshold- as if, before the rupture, in order to achieve it, he had to give philosophy every chance, its last...” ibid., p. 159.
4 “By the end of the 1960’s, Althusser had moved the epistemological break from 1845 to much later in Marx’s life- namely 1882, the year before he died! ‘The tendency of Marx’s thought’, said Althusser, presumably tongue in cheek, ‘drove him irresistibly to the radical abandonment of every shade of Hegelian influence, as can be seen by...1882 Notes on Wagner.’” MacGregor, D. (1998), Hegel and Marx after the Fall of Communism, University of Wales Press, Cardiff, p. 40.
Besides, Hyppolite and Kedourie suggest that there is continuity in Marx’s thought with reference to his relationship with Hegel and argue that his mature work could only be understood with this philosophical background (Çelik, 2005:62-63). To sum up, it should be kept in mind that, evaluation of Marx’s ideas is not satisfactorily neutral and presentation of ‘who is Marx’ necessarily implies a theoretical position, including this very effort.

Throughout the exploration of Marx’s concept(s?) of ideology, the intellectual sources of Marx’s thought will be evaluated with specific reference to Hegel and Feuerbach. As the fundamental texts on ideology are polemical works against either Hegel or Feuerbach, clarification of the term to a certain extent depends on understanding Marx’s relation to them. Writings such as Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Theses on Feuerbach, Feuerbach chapter of The German Ideology and finally, Fetishism of Commodities chapter of Marx’s magnum opus; Capital will be evaluated. During the exploration, some of the key commentators’ ideas about major issues will be provided. The study will end with a comment on ideology in conclusion.

1. YOUNG MARX’S ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY

Intellectual sources of Marx are stated by Lenin as German Philosophy, British Political Economy and French Socialism. Together with the advances in natural sciences in 19th century, basically these currents shaped Marx’s thought (Hilav, 1997:171). In his youth, Marx had a close relationship with a group of intellectuals called Young Hegelians, specifically with Ludwig Feuerbach.

Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right provides an early insight to Marx’s treatment of ideology. Here, the critical stance towards religion can be seen as a starting point of the criticism of all other fields. Marx employs Feuerbachian approach to religion and criticizes Hegel who is supposed by Feuerbach to be the last defender of theology (McLellan, 2000:6). Marx argues that the alienated existence of men is resolved in a creation of a transcendental solution:

“man makes religion, religion does not make man. Religion is indeed the self-consciousness and self-awareness of man who either has not yet attained himself or has already lost himself again...this state, this society, produces religion’s inverted attitude to the world, because they are an inverted world themselves...Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature...It is the opium of the people.” (McLellan, 2000:70-71).

Although Marx does not use the term ideology yet, it is clear that, as Ricoeur points out, the line of reasoning is already present. Religion is a reflection, an inverted one, of the world and it functions in legitimating the existing system. The existing alienation of man is solved and the essence of man is realized only by a transcendental mechanism (Çelik, 2005:109-110). The criticism of religion can be used in revealing the true source of religion and finally the revealing reality. Thus, the criticism of religion is truly a starting point in overcoming the alienation of man and providing conditions for realization of man’s true nature. At this point, it should be mentioned that although Marx employs Feuerbach’s arguments, later he declared critical views against the abstract essence of man in Theses On Feuerbach.
The emphasis on practical and material conditions of human existence leads Marx to criticize Feuerbach’s abstract conceptualization of essence of man. Marx contends that: “Feuerbach, consequently, does not see that the ‘religious sentiment’ is itself a social product, and that the abstract individual whom he analyses belongs to a particular form of society.” (McLellan, 2000:173). Therefore, the criticism of religious alienation should be provided with an emphasis on historical and practical conditions of man’s existence, which Marx dealt in 1844 Manuscripts.

Eagleton argues that, Marx’s theory of ideology can be seen as a part of a more comprehensive theory of alienation. In a certain stage of development, products of humans escape from their control and assume autonomous existence. The result of this estrangement is seen in the perception of the inevitability of existing social conditions which is merely the result of human activity (Eagleton, 1991:70). The evaluation of alienated existence of man is the main theme of 1844 Manuscripts. Alienation from the product of labor, from the labor process, from species being and from other man is evaluated (Marx, 2007:72-78). About this text, Althusser connotes that not only the terminology like ‘alienation’, ‘species being’, ‘total being’, but also the basic philosophical problematic is Feuerbachian (Althusser, 1900:45). Against this interpretation, Kelly (1966:781) argues that the concept of ‘alienation’ which is central in 1844 Manuscripts is borrowed from Hegel. A different interpretation defended by Easton (1961:193-196) points that although Marx speaks out his indebtedness to Hegel clearly, he severely criticizes Hegel holding Feuerbach’s line. Marx’s appreciation of Hegel’s Phenomenology can be found as:

“The outstanding thing in Hegel’s Phenomenology and its final outcome—that is, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle—is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-genesis of man as a process, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of labour and comprehends objective man-true, because real man- as the outcome of man’s own labor.” (Marx, 2007:151)

In labor, which is nothing more than objectified alienated existence of man, there is the possibility to overcome this alienation. It is a dialectic process in which negation of alienation can be possible not in abstract thought but with praxis. (Hilav, 1997:172). Marx criticizes Hegel’s understanding of labor only in an abstract manner. Consequently, he argues that Hegel can only overcome alienation in thought. Here, Kedourie points that Marx misunderstood Hegel about the usage of labor. (Çelik, 2005:184). A careful reading of Phenomenology reveals that especially in the chapter on Lordship and Bondage, Hegel uses labor in a concrete manner. Moreover, in this chapter, Hegel, “who sounds like a Marxist” (Rockmore, 1997:70), pointed the instable nature of any relation of inequality that provides valuable insights to Marx about emancipation.

5 “The only labor which Hegel knows and recognizes is abstractly mental labor.” Marx, op cit., p. 152.
6 “Labor, on the other hand, is desire restrained and checked, evanescence delayed and postponed; in other words, labour shapes and fashions the thing...This negative mediating agency...which now in the work it does is externalized and passes into the condition of permanence.” Hegel, G.W.F. (1967), The Phenomenology of Mind, translated by J. B. Baillie, Harper Torchbooks, New York, p. 238.
7 “just as lordship, showed its essential nature to be the reverse of what it wants to be, so, too, bondage will, when completed, pass into the opposite of what immediately is: being a consciousness repressed within itself, it will enter into itself, and change round into real and true independence.” Hegel, op cit., p. 237.
Notwithstanding the disputes, Marx’s treatment of alienation provides insights about his treatment of ideology. Marx saw alienation as limitation of human creativity, an obstacle to realization of human species being. Man’s own product becoming alien and hostile against him is only possible because it belongs to the owner of the means of production. Marx points out that private property is the consequence of alienated labor. Rejection of abstract, transcendental entities posited against individuals who are the real producers of these things, can be seen as a model for ideology. Without using the term ideology, here, Marx provided the basis for the dissolution of the ideological by praxis. (Çelik, 2005:86).

2. THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY

*The German Ideology* is the first comprehensive and perhaps the most controversial analysis of ideology in Marx’s writings. Usual interpretation of ideology as ‘false consciousness’ came from this text. However, as Barrett points out, Marx never used the term ‘false consciousness’ himself. This phrase is first used by Engels in his letter to Franz Mehring in 1893 (Barret, 1991:5). The German Ideology is a polemical text which is written against the idealism of Hegel and mechanical materialism of Feuerbach. The apparent tension in the arguments should be seen within the light of Marx’s hard task. Schmidt rightly connotes that: “Marx argued against the old materialism in idealist fashion, and against idealism in materialist fashion.” (Larrain, 1984:18). Marx’s main aim is to show that consciousness is not independent from material conditions and consciousness is not a passive reflection of reality, against idealism and materialism respectively. In the most contentious definition of ideology, Marx argued that:

“Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active men. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious being, and the being of men is their actual life process. If in all ideology men and their relations appear upside-down as in a *camera obscura*, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.” (Marx and Engels, 1998:42).

Here, ideology is seen as a false, distorted representation of the reality. Camera obscura metaphor is usually interpreted as false consciousness. Defining a false representation of man’s objective position in material reality implies a division among correct and false consciousness. Thus, ideology and science can be posed as mutually exclusive spheres (Üşür, 1997:12-13). In the continuing passage, Marx identifies ideology as a reflection of reality, rather than false representation of it.

“The phantoms formed in the brains of men are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, and all the rest of ideology, as well as the forms of consciousness corresponding to these, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence...It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness.”

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Here, ideology is defined broadly as encompassing morality, religion, metaphysics and seen as a mere ‘phantom’, a reflection of reality. Moreover, about the relationship between consciousness and material conditions, the determination is reversed. Morality, religion and metaphysics are seen as bound to development of material conditions rather than having their own history. The vocabulary here, as Eagleton rightly points out, strongly reminds mechanical materialism (Eagleton, 1991:73). Marx’s criticisms of German Idealism, or more appropriately of Hegel resulted in conceptualization of ideas as ‘phantoms’, ‘reflexes’, ‘echoes’ in shorthand which raises some problems as it solves some (Mardin, 2004:33). Marx reproduced the naive dualism of mechanical materialism, namely dividing ‘ideas’ and ‘material reality’ and reversed the causality. Williams (1997:59) points the harming effects of vocabulary as: “The emphasis on consciousness as inseparable from conscious existence, and then on conscious existence as inseparable from material social process, is in effect lost in the use of this deliberately degrading vocabulary.” Thus, Marx’s severe criticism directed against Hegel’s view of history as phases of consciousness or ideas, resulted in a loss in meaning and reduction of ideas as secondary. Moreover, considering the ‘ideological’ as a mere reflection of material life has the risk of diminishing the need for an ideology theory. If there is not any meaning of ideology independent from material life, or to borrow Poulantzas’ term, if ideology has no ‘relative autonomy’, why do we bother to analyze it? (Çelik, 2005:140). A structural interpretation of ideology as reflection clearly diminishes the possibilities of escaping the ideological illusion. However, Marx emphasized the creative power and ability of individual to point the opportunity of change. For Marx, people are not mechanical units determined by structural conditions but rather have a valuable capacity: “Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness.” (Marx and Engels, 1998: 37). As we can see Marx’s later writings, he clearly included consciousness as part of human material social process and it was the unfortunately tense vocabulary that resulted in the lost of this meaning in The German Ideology.

The metaphors like camera obscura opened debates about whether or not ideology has a negative connotation. Interpretations that see ideology with negative connotation argued it as an epistemological problem of ‘false consciousness’, which is posed against science. Epistemological tones are apparent in the metaphors of distortion and illusion (Çelik, 2005:97). Conceptualization of ideology against science can be traced in Marx’s writings: “Where speculation ends, where real life starts, there consequently begins real, positive science.” (Marx and Engels, 1998:43). This reflects the influence of Enlightenment in Marx’s thought. Ideological mystification can be fought by the means of reason, by science. Against this mainly accepted argument, McCartney connotes that Marx used ideology strictly as a descriptive term. It arises from objective historical conditions, namely the class society. Moreover, the term ‘ideology’ is usually used with an adjective and in the passage which includes camera obscura metaphor; there is a specific reference to ‘German Ideology’, not ideology in general.

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9 “What distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement.” Cited by Williams, op cit., p. 59.
The implications of McCartney’s interpretation are crucial about the development of ideology in Marxist thought. If one accepts the neutral connotation of ideology in Marx, then it becomes closer to the line of Lenin who conceptualized ideology as thoughts associated to classes (Barret;1991:8). Connected to this point, Marx’s analysis of relationship between ruling class and ruling ideas is crucial:

“The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force...The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material conditions, the dominant material relations grasped as ideas; hence of the relations which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance.” (Marx and Engels,1998:67).

Here, Marx connotes a political model of ideology rather than an epistemological one. The ones who dominate material production also dominate the means of mental production. This raises a question: What makes ideas ideological? That these ideas are the ideal representation of material conditions or they serve the ruling class? (Eagleton,1991:79). Ideology can be separated from ideas in general as a set of ideas which express the practice insufficiently. An important nuance is pointed by Larrain: from this text, it is misleading to infer that ruling ideology is the ideology of the ruling class. Marx is arguing about ideas in general, not about ideology. The expression ‘ruling ideology’ is confusing as Marx never wrote about a ‘dominated ideology’. Thus, he did not mention ‘ideology of the proletariat’. (Larrain,1984:24-26).

Marx’s treatment of the relation between ruling class and ideas is criticized chiefly by the reduction of ideology to class belongingness. The subjection relation needs more sophisticated treatment since we can find people who control ‘the means of mental production’ but do not necessarily reflect the ideas of the ruling class. Moreover, are there social divisions other than classes such as gender or race which imply a more complex relation among ruling class and ruling ideas. For instance, the case of patriotism provides an alliance of several class ideologies which shows the class-belongingness of political ideologies should not be taken for granted. (Barret;1991:10-11).

For a class to be revolutionary, Marx argued that: “in order to carry through its aim, to present its interest as the common interest of all the members of society...it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and present them as the only rational and universally valid ones.” (Marx and Engels,1998:68). Moreover, Marx continued that revolutionary class, together with whole society, confronts the ruling class and its rule. Zima argues that presentation of the class interest as the interest of the whole society is only real in the revolution of proletariat, and in all other circumstances it is ideological (Cited by Özbek, 2003:78).
The revolution of proletariat will be the victory of all classes. The contradictions arising from class rule will be resolved and thus there ceases to be a need for ideological representation of particular interest as general. This text implies the end of ideology together with the end of class society. Moreover, Çelik (2005:131) argues that attributing ‘truth’ to the actions of proletariat per se, reveals eschatological notions in Marx’s thought. Larrain (1984:228-229) holds that Marx’s utopia is negative in the sense that he refused to provide a schemata of communist society. Nevertheless, in The German Ideology, he suggested that division of labour itself will be abolished.

About the ‘division of labor’, Althusser contends that its ambiguous role The German Ideology is because of the tension of the ‘break’. Division of labor, “plays the principal part taken by alienation in the writings of his youth, and commands the whole theory of ideology and the whole theory of science.” (Althusser,1990:37) Although terms are changed, there is continuity in Marx’s analysis which emphasizes the need for overcoming alienation of individuals. Marx points out that as the division between mental and material labor starts, consciousness “really represents something without representing something real; from now on consciousness is in a position to emancipate itself from the world and the proceed to the formation of ‘pure’ theory, theology, philosophy, morality” (Marx and Engels,1998:50). This is clearly in line with Marx’s criticism of religion in Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. The alienated existence of man, resulting from the division, opens way to pure theoretical speculation and a transcendental solution to existing alienation. Moreover, Marx’s notes on division of labor provide insights to analysis of fetishism of commodities in Capital. Kolakovski connotes that, although the word ‘alienation’ is used rarely, the analysis of commodity fetishism is nothing but a particularization or reproduction of theory of alienation developed in 1844 Manuscripts. (Kolakovski,1978:173). Fine & Saad-Filho (2004:26-28) argue that Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism forges a link with his earlier work and can be made basis for a theory of alienation or reification.

3. CAPITAL

Marx’s detailed analysis of capitalist relations of production in Capital begins with the analysis of commodities. He accepted that, since beginnings are difficult in sciences, the most challenging part of the book will be the first one which he analyses commodities (Marx,1990:89). Revealing the secret of fetishism of commodities is an essential task that is closely related to understanding the functioning of ideology. In the exchange of commodities, what is really exchanged is the labor-power which is spent by proletariat. The ultimately social character of labor should be taken into consideration. However, in the fetishism of commodities:

10 “rule of a certain class is only the rule of certain ideas, comes to a natural end, of course, as soon as class rule in general ceases to be the form in which society is organised...as soon as it is no longer necessary to represent a particular interest as general or the ‘general interest’ as ruling” Marx & Engels, op cit., p. 69.
11 “The social power, i.e., the multiplied productive force, which arises through the co-operation of different individuals as it is caused by the division of labour, appears to these individuals, since their co-operation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus are no longer able to control.” Marx & Engels, op cit., p. 53-54.
“the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic relations between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the products of human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world of commodities with the products of men’s hands.” (Marx, 1990:165).

The secret of fetishism of commodities is explained by an analogy that is familiar from Marx’s critique of religion in *Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*. Man’s own creations, whether it is religion or commodities, assume an independent power, endowed with life, enter into relations with each other. The social character of labor is concealed since the real relation between men appears as relation between things. Therefore, what is distorted is not the consciousness, but rather the reality itself (Üşür, 1997:20). Here, ideology is not the problem of seeing the things as they are, but rather a problem of a deceitful reality. Therefore, what is needed to fight against ideology is a science that reveals the true nature of reality; an explanation that goes beyond mere appearances to find the essence of the relationship. (Eagleton, 1991:87). For Marx, the real relations are different from the appearances as he demonstrated in the analysis of commodity fetishism and elsewhere.¹²

Zizek’s interpretation of commodity fetishism connotes that in feudal society, the fetishism was in the relations between men, which looked like Hegel’s characterization of Lordship and Bondage. The emergence of capitalism de-fetishised the relations between men at the expense of fetishising the relations between things (Zizek, 1992:26). As the domination and servitude diminished, workers seem to be free and equal. Zizek points the simple definition of ideology in *Capital* as: “they do not know it, but they are doing it” (Zizek, 1992:28).¹³ This concept of ideology entails misrecognition of reality, a distorted representation and a false consciousness of social reality. But precisely where is the source of illusion? In ‘knowing’ or ‘doing’? Occasionally ideology is seen as an epistemological problem, a problem of knowledge. But Zizek contends that the illusion is already at work in social reality itself, in the level of ‘doing’. Fetishism is in practice, rather than in theory (Zizek, 1992:28-31). Thus, Zizek (1992:21) brilliantly points that: “Ideological is not the false consciousness of a (social) being but this being itself in so far as it is supported by false consciousness.” Ideology functions as concealing the contradictory nature of reality, but the source of the concealment is the reality itself. While ideology is beneficial to the ruling class, its effects occur throughout the society. The illusion of ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ of laborers arises precisely from this point (Çelik, 2005:180).

¹² “The final pattern of economic relations as seen on the surface...is very much different from, and indeed quite the reverse of, their inner but concealed essential pattern and the conception corresponding to it.” Cited by Larrain, (1984), op cit., p. 33.

¹³ However, this sentence is translated by Ben Fowkes as: “They do this without being aware of it.” Marx, K. (1990: 166-167).
Marx’s analysis of the fetishism of commodities in his ‘mature’ work, *Capital*, for Althusser, is a ‘detrimental’ analysis that carries the last sign of Hegel’s influence (Althusser, 2006:34). It is inspired by Marx’s re-reading of Hegel’s *Logic* as we find the distinction between two levels of reality; the level of appearances or phenomenal forms and the level of real relations or the essence (Larrain, 1984:31).

Marx’s making use of Hegel’s method and his declaration of appreciation to Hegel in *Postface to the Second Edition* of *Capital* opened up a serious debate. Marx (1990:103) argued that dialectic “with him standing on its head. It must be inverted, in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.” For Althusser (1990:90-91), ‘turning upside down’ raises lots of questions as it answers some. Since a simple inversion of dialectic can not overcome the metaphysical nature of Hegelian ideology, which for Althusser ‘contaminated’ the dialectic, this expression should be seen only as metaphorical. Overall, the debate about Marx’s intellectual development with reference to ideology is a highly contentious and philosophic one which can not be properly discussed here. Nevertheless, the aim in the conclusion is to reach some inferences.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Marx’s treatment of ideology is unfortunately ambiguous, tense and scattered which makes the job of interpretation a tough one. Reconstruction of theory of ideology includes the evaluation of texts directly relevant to ideology as well as the ones that barely mention ideology. Moreover, the result of this exploration can not be safely labeled as “Marx’s theory of ideology”. At best, there are some ideas about how Marx saw ideology, which are not uniform and elaborated. The vocabulary, especially the careless metaphors that Marx employs often becomes source of controversy. Besides, what challenges the most is the philosophical investigation of Marx’s relationship with Hegel and Feuerbach with reference to ideology. These thinkers, to some extent, not only provided the background of Marx’s thought, but also were direct targets in Marx’s polemical works. The exploration of how Marx utilized and criticized them is a huge effort that is not solely a matter of interpretation. Identification of a ‘break’ or ‘evolution’ or ‘continuity’ reflects a political choice about ‘who is Marx’. The argument supported here will be one of ‘middle way’. Despite the undeniable change and improvement in Marx’s thought, it points an ‘evolution’ rather than a sharp ‘break’.

In *Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*, Marx’s harsh critique of religion and demonstration of it as a transcendental solution to existing alienated condition of man has obvious similarities to *1844 Manuscripts*. In the latter, with his acquaintance to British Political Economy, Marx used economic concepts to analyze the alienated existence of man. He argued that private property is the result of alienation. Thus, he showed that in the existing relations of production; the independent, powerful existence of one’s own products of labor against him, i.e. the existence of private property, is a condition of alienation. Utilizing the driving force of ‘negative’ in Hegel’s dialectic, Marx argued that this negation of man, i.e. the negation of man’s true nature, can be overcome by another negation, by praxis.
In *The German Ideology*, the alienation motive exists with the undertone that division of labor is the root of evil. The abolition of division of labor is something quite similar to supersession of alienation. With the division of labor, especially with division of mental and material labor, consciousness sinks into formation of pure theory, theology and etc. This point is in line with production of religion as a solution of alienated existence of man in *Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right*.

The usual interpretation of ideology in *The German Ideology* is ‘false consciousness’. Besides the fact that Marx did not use the term, this reductionism is quite misleading. It is true that there is an epistemological and negative connotation of ideology in the text, but it is unfair to caricaturize it as such. At this point, the polemical nature of the text and inattentive use of metaphors raises confusion. It should be kept in mind that establishing the premises of materialist conception of history is an uneasy task and necessarily a kind of sketchy framework to be elaborated properly later.

Marx’s comprehensive analysis of capitalist relations of production in *Capital* can be seen as the accomplishment of the task which early writings merely point. Ideology, is solidly established here as the distorted existence of the phenomenal forms. Rather than seeing ideology as a problem of false or distorted knowing that appears in the consciousness, it is seen as a deformation in the reality itself that confronts everyone. Marx’s appreciation of Hegel and making use of his dialectics in *Capital* and Althusser acceptance of fetishism of commodities chapter as the last sign of Hegel’s influence, can be seen as contrary evidence to a ‘break’ with specific reference to the discussion of ideology. What is crucial here about ideology is that the fetishism of commodities chapter is exclusively built on Hegelian essence/appearance dichotomy. Thus, the line of evolution from alienation to division of labor to fetishism of commodities is a striking one.

To sum up, one should appreciate, if not the form but the rich content of Marx’s arguments about ideology. Though complicated to understand and to narrate, the implications of this valuable analysis are remarkable. With just a little glance to people around us, we can verify Marx’s assertion: “They do not know it, but they are doing it.”
BIBLIOGRAPHY


